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ENCOURAGING COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR: 
MEMORIAL SLOAN-KETTERING’S MODEL BEHAVIOR 
By A. Isabel Heine 
INTRODUCTION 
The concept of a moral hazard is a traditionally economic term that is defined as 
“excessive expenditure due to eligibility for insurance benefits.”1   This economic term has found 
its way into the health care world to mean the additional health care services or treatment that is 
purchased by individuals once they become insured.
2
  For example, an insured individual may 
spend an extra day in the hospital that is not necessary simply because he/she can due to their 
insurance coverage.
3
  According to economists, the patient consumer’s view of the cost of that 
extra day at the hospital is zero because their health insurance is paying for it.
4
  One can imagine 
that this was not viewed favorably by the health insurance companies and this economic concept 
has therefore created a trend towards higher co-payments and deductibles for patients.
5
  The 
rationale behind these increases is that health care consumers will avoid imprudent and pricier 
health care treatments or services if the co-payment up front is higher.
6
  This unfortunately has 
unintended consequences.  The uninsured and underinsured will tend to underuse and forego 
essential health care services, which may then result in higher morbidity and an increase in 
preventable hospitalizations and deaths.
7
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Health insurance coverage in the United States has increased from 45 percent of the 
population in 1960 to about 83 percent of the population in 2011.
8
  During that same 51-year 
span, the percentage of United States Gross Domestic Product attributable to personal health care 
rose from 4.4 percent to more than 15 percent.
9
  There is an undeniable relationship between the 
number of insured Americans and rising health care spending.   
But health insurance is not going anywhere and with the implementation of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) many more Americans will be insured than ever 
before.  There are cost-containment provisions related to copayments to help curb some of 
individual health care consumer spending, but one thing that is not being controlled is the costs 
of services and treatments in general.
10
  The concept of the moral hazard as related to health care 
does not seem to be going anywhere either, so why not remove it?  Comparative effectiveness 
research (CER) has the potential to do this in a sense through its consideration of cost and 
expansive evidentiary standards.  By removing a pricier and otherwise no more effective 
alternative from a health care consumer’s pool of choices, the possibility of increased 
consumption due to coverage evaporates. 
CER is very divisive.  Although a lot of federal resources have been dedicated to CER, 
there are other decisions made by the federal government that demonstrate their ambivalence to 
the concept.  Its opponents refer to it as the rationing of health care and point to programs such as 
                                                          
8
 Carmen DeNavas-Walt, Bernadette D. Proctor, Jessica C. Smith, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage 
in the United States: 2010, UNITED STATES CENSUS Bureau (2011): 60-239, available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p60-239.pdf.  
9
Table 1.1 – Personal Health Care (PHC) Expenditures by Source of Funds: Selected Calendar Years 1960-2011,  
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/MedicareMedicaidStatSupp/2012.html  
10
 See, e.g., PPACA § 2705, 124 Stat. 119, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4 (for an example of caps and waivers on 
copayments and other cost-sharing mechanisms). 
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the Oregon Health Plan as an example of how this type of decisionmaking can fail.  Some small 
institutions continue to press on with the core ideals of CER, encouraging the idea of treating 
patients based on evidence of the benefits and harms of alternative treatments, which includes 
the consideration of cost.  When the power of CER is harnessed effectively, one hospital’s 
decision to not offer a new drug to their patient population can help influence other providers as 
well.  One particular area of health care worth analyzing due to its tendency of including pricy 
treatments is cancer care. 
After an examination of the current state of cancer care in the United States in Part I, Part 
II of this piece will address the history and concept of comparative effectiveness research.  
Opposition to CER will be addressed, with a particular focus on the Oregon Health Plan.  In Part 
III, the story of one hospital, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, will be discussed and 
their decisionmaking process will be examined to demonstrate how CER can be used.  The 
ramifications of their decision will be evaluated as well.  Part IV will introduce the reader to the 
Accountable Care Organization model and demonstrate how this may in fact be an endorsement 
of CER-type decisionmaking.  Finally, in Part V this piece will conclude that CER is a workable 
model for health care organizations despite the conflicting messages from our current 
administration. 
PART I: THE CURRENT STATE OF CANCER CARE: DATA THAT CANNOT BE IGNORED 
In 2006, the annual cost for cancer care was $104 billion and is projected to reach $173 
billion by 2020.
11
  Much of this rise can be attributed to the dramatic increase in cancer drugs.  
One example for breast cancer chemotherapy in general showed not only a doubling in use of 
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 Thomas J. Smith, M.D., and Bruce E. Hillner,, M.D., Bending the Cost Curve in Cancer Care, 364 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 2060 (2011). 
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chemotherapy, but also a near doubling in the average cost of treatment between 1991 and 2002 
($8,288 to $15,974 in 2012 US dollars).
12,13
  Across all new cancer drugs, the trend is the same.  
In 2002, the average cost of a new cancer drug for one month of treatment was about $4,500 
(adjusted to 2012 dollars), whereas 2010 prices demonstrate a median price of $10,000.
14
  Figure 
1 demonstrates the monthly costs of cancer drugs at the time of approval by the Food and Drug 
Administration from 1965 through 2008.
15
  Figure 1 does contain outliers but the trend line 
demonstrates the increasing costs over time. In removing the outliers (Figure 2), the trend is even 
more pronounced, demonstrating a near exponential rise in the monthly cost of treatment.  
Additionally, our country’s increasing costs in cancer care do not yield better results.  Compared 
to Canada’s $4,500/person annual cost of cancer care, the United States spends $8,100/person, 
without demonstrating better results.
16
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 Elena B. Elkin, PhD; Peter B. Bach, MD, MAPP, Cancer’s Next Frontier: Addressing High and Increasing Costs, 
303(11) JAMA 1086 (2010). 
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These increasing costs create a burden on the Medicare and Medicaid systems and the 
insurance industry as well.  Average annual health insurance premiums for family coverage have 
risen 97 percent between 2002 and 2012.
17  
The rise in costs has had a staggering effect on the 
American family as well.  A comprehensive survey conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation 
in 2006 explored some of the financial effects of cancer on the American household.  Fifty-six 
percent of those surveyed experienced an increase in the past year in the costs of drugs related to 
their cancer.
18
  Twenty-five percent used up all or most of their savings as a result of the 
financial cost of dealing with their cancer.
19
  Eleven percent were unable to pay for basic 
necessities, like food heat or housing, as a result of the financial cost of dealing with their 
cancer.
20
  Thirteen percent were contacted by a collection agency and 3 percent declared 
bankruptcy as a result of the financial cost of dealing with their cancer.
21
  The numbers are even 
higher in particular types of cancer.  Eight percent of families dealing with lung cancer are 
bankrupt due to the cost of care.
22
  Even patients with private insurance, where one may expect 
adequate coverage, still suffer out-of-pocket costs of more than $18,000/year, and 5 percent of 
those patients have out-of-pocket costs greater than $35,000/year.
23
 
Oncologists are beginning to speak out against the pharmaceutical manufacturers 
regarding the prices of anti-cancer therapies, calling the pricing unsustainable and often 
                                                          
17
Employer Health Benefits: 2012 Summary of Findings, The Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research & 
Educational Trust (2012), http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2012/8346.pdf. 
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 National Survey of Households Affected by Cancer, The USA Today/Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard School 
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Specialty Drug Use, 25(5) HEALTH AFF., 1319 (2006), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/25/5/1319.full.pdf. 
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immoral.
24
  Although, little tangible evidence exists to suggest that pharmaceutical companies 
are reacting to the opposition. 
PART II: COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH AS A BODY OF WORK: SUPPORT OR 
AMBIVALENCE FOR THIS TYPE OF DECISIONMAKING? 
One common theme throughout many pieces pointing out these daunting statistics is that 
the solutions are within the hands of the oncologists themselves, including chemotherapy and 
other treatment choices.
25
  Suggested changes in practice include the recognition that the costs of 
care are driven by what the physicians do and do not do and that the need for cost-effectiveness 
analysis and other limits on care must be accepted.
26
  This is where comparative effectiveness 
research fits in nicely. 
A.  The Conflicting History of Comparative Effectiveness Research: Promotion and Restriction 
 CER has long been used in the United Kingdom where the National Institute of Clinical 
Excellence uses a metric known as the Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) to determine 
coverage.
27
  A QALY accounts for such factors as the improvement in the quality of life and the 
side effects a treatment may cause, which lead to such considerations as the level of pain a 
person is in or their mobility.
28
  After determining the QALY measurement of a particular 
treatment, the treatment is then evaluated to see how much it would cost per QALY, in other 
words, “the cost of using the drugs to provide a year of the best quality of life available.”29  Each 
treatment is considered on an individual basis but generally a treatment will be considered cost 
                                                          
24
 Andrew Pollack, Doctors Denounce Cancer Drug Prices of $100,000 a Year, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2013 at B1.  
25
 Sandra M. Swain, The High Cost of a Cancer Drug: An Oncologist’s View, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2012 at A22. 
26
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effective, and therefore covered, if it falls within $33,000 – $50,000 per QALY.30  NICE makes 
sure to point out that this is not the only measurement used to determine coverage.
31
 
There are other suggested comparative effectiveness limitations that use the QALY 
metric for suggested coverage. One study created a line for cost ineffectiveness by using the 
$50,000 cost per life-year-gained as a measure.
32
  This number is derived from the decision to 
use federal funding to pay for dialysis but reflects the 1982 cost.
33
  The researchers adjusted the 
1982 cost to find a value of $197,000 per life-year-gained in 2007 dollars and made this the 
threshold for coverage.
34
  The World Health Organization (WHO) has also issued their own 
comparative effectiveness guidance.  WHO’s guidance uses a multiple of a country’s per capita 
gross domestic product (GDP): less than or equal to one times the country’s GDP is considered 
very cost effective; one to three times the GDP as simply cost effective; and more than three 
times the GDP as cost ineffective.
35  The World Bank listed the United States’ per capita GDP at 
$48,112 in 2011, making our three times threshold $144,336, or what the maximum cost per 
QALY would be to label a treatment cost ineffective.
36
 
Officially, the Institute of Medicine defines comparative effectiveness research as “… the 
generation and synthesis of evidence that compares the benefits and harms of alternative 
methods to prevent, diagnose, treat, and monitor a clinical condition or to improve the delivery 
of care.  The purpose of comparative effectiveness research is to assist consumers, clinicians, 
                                                          
30
 John Donnelly, Comparative Effectiveness Research, HEALTH AFF.: HEALTH POLICY BRIEF, 
http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_28.pdf  
31
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 Bruce E. Hillner, Thomas J. Smith, Efficacy Does Not Necessarily Translate to Cost Effectiveness: A Case Study 
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33
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Guidelines on Generalized Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 9 HEALTH ECON. 235 (2000). 
36
 The World Bank, GDP per capita (current US$), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD 
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purchasers and policy makers to make informed decisions that will improve health care at both 
the individual and population levels.”37  Historically, two big forces led to the prominence of 
comparative effectiveness research.  One was the focus on delivering clinical care based on 
evidence, which began in the 1980s and led to the creation of the US Preventive Services 
Taskforce in 1984 and the Cochrane Collaboration in 1993, followed by the evidence-based 
practice centers of the Agency of Healthcare Research and Quality in 1998.
38
  On the other hand 
was the need to make care more effective while containing costs, with the research being led by 
the work of John Weinberg and Elliot Fisher on the area of spending and outcomes.
39
  One of 
their more prominent studies demonstrated that high health care spending areas of the country do 
not have better health outcomes than their counterparts in lower health care spending areas of the 
country.
40
  In 1996, the U.S. Public Health Service suggested evaluating certain drugs and 
treatments based on how many years of healthy life they produced per dollar, a measure 
synonymous with CER and in 2003, George W. Bush signed the Medicare Modernization Act 
into law, authorizing $50 million to be used towards cost effectiveness research of health care 
treatments.
41
 
The drive for evidence and the drive for cost containment also led to a report from the 
Congressional Budget Office in 2007.
42
  The report included research on the comparative 
                                                          
37
 Initial National Priorities for Comparative Effectiveness Research (2009), 
http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2009/ComparativeEffectivenessResearchPriorities.aspx 
38
 Jodi Segal, MD, MPH, Comparative Effectiveness Research: Recent Past to Present, 
http://ictr.johnshopkins.edu/ictr/CER.Segal.pdf.  
39
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 Gail R. Wilensky, The Policies and Politics of Creating a Comparative Clinical Effectiveness Research Center, 
28(4) HEALTH AFF. W79 (2009). 
41
Philip Longman, The Republican Case for Waste in Health Care, THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY (Mar./Apr. 2013), 
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/march_april_2013/features/the_republican_case_for_waste043314.p
hp?page=5  
42
 Research on the Comparative Effectiveness of Medical Treatments, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET Office (2007), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/88xx/doc8891/12-18-
comparativeeffectiveness.pdf. 
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effectiveness of medical treatments, which led to the conclusion that it is possible to constrain 
health care costs both in the public programs and in the rest of the health system without 
adversely affecting the health of individuals.
43
  The report also pointed out that geographic 
differences in health care spending do not lead to higher life expectancies or measured 
improvements in other health outcomes in the more health care costly regions.
44
  The report also 
expressed concern for the fact that patients and their caregivers have limited access to 
information on which treatments work best for which patients and whether the benefits of pricier 
treatments warrant the added expense.
45
  Additionally the report posited that Medicare spending 
– and perhaps all health care expenditure in the country – could be cut by 30 percent if the more 
conservative practice styles used in the lowest spending one-fifth of the country could be adopted 
nationwide.”46 This report advocated for further research on the comparative effectiveness of 
medical treatments. 
2007 and 2008 saw successive legislation encouraging further cost-effectiveness metrics.  
The Children’s Health and Medicare Protection (CHAMP) Act bill was created with the purpose 
of extending Medicaid benefits to low-income children and would have involved the creation of 
a Center for Comparative Effectiveness Research within the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality.
47
  The bill never made it to the Senate.
48
  In the following year, the Comparative 
Effectiveness Research Act (known as Baucus-Conrad for its two sponsors) was introduced with 
the purpose of creating the Health Care Comparative Effectiveness Research Institute.
49,50
  This 
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48
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institute would use evidence-based research to generate treatment information on how to attain 
the best clinical outcomes.
51
  Both bills used the term comparative clinical effectiveness research 
and the latter suggested that cost-effectiveness should be explored.
52 
The American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA) of 2009 had a powerful impact 
on comparative effectiveness research when it provided for $1.1 billion for patient-centered 
health care research.
53
  This was followed in 2010 by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (PPACA), which included a section titled Patient-Centered Outcomes Research.
54
  In 
PPACA, comparative effectiveness research is defined as “research evaluating and comparing 
health outcomes and the clinical effectiveness, risks, and benefits of 2 or more medical 
treatments, services, and items described.”55  PPACA also established the Patient-Centered 
Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI), which notably is an independent non-profit organization 
and not an agency of the government.
56
  PCORI’s mission is to “assist patients, clinicians, 
purchasers, and policymakers in making informed health decisions by advancing the quality and 
relevance of evidence concerning the manner in which diseases… can effectively and 
appropriately be prevented, diagnoses, treated … through research and evidence synthesis … the 
dissemination of research findings…”57  In December, 2012, PCORI announced it would be 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
50
 The Comparative Effectiveness Research Institute was the precursor to the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research 
Institute (PCORI).  Its name was changed due to the controversy over the inference that comparative effectiveness 
research would be used.  Kathryn Nix, Comparative Effectiveness Research Under Obamacare: A Slippery Slope to 
Health Care Rationing, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Apr 12, 2012) 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/04/comparative-effectiveness-research-under-obamacare-a-slippery-
slope-to-health-care-rationing 
51
 Id. 
52
 Wilensky, supra note 40. 
53
 RECOVERY.GOV TRACK THE MONEY, http://www.recovery.gov/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 29, 2013). 
54
 PPACA § 6301, 124 Stat. 119, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320e. 
55
 Id. 
56
 Id. 
57
 PATIENT-CENTERED OUTCOMES RESEARCH INSTITUTE, www.pcori.org/about-us/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2013).  
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disbursing more than $40.7 million worth of funding for its first comparative effectiveness 
research projects.
58
 
Although the history of CER suggests an inclination by our government to further this 
type of research, PCORI’s focus is on patient-centered outcomes research, which does not 
necessarily equate to CER.  Under PPCACA, PCORI is allowed to compare the benefits of 
various treatments but not compare the costs to benefits of various treatments.
59
  Additionally, 
PPACA states that PCORI “shall not develop or employ a dollars-per-quality adjusted life 
year (or similar measure that discounts the value of a life because of an individual’s 
disability) as a threshold to establish what type of health care is cost effective or 
recommended.”60  Quality-adjusted life years are at the center of recommendations and 
guidelines by those that practice comparative effectiveness research.  The QALY metric involves 
quantifying the two things that most people would want from their health care: the most years of 
quality of life and the least cost for those years.
61
  Conducting CER without the use of QALYs or 
a similar metric seems undoable. 
One explanation for this sharp restraint on comparative effectiveness research is the 
composition of PCORI’s Board of Governors.  The board consists, although not solely, of 
pharmaceutical and device manufacturer executives as well as the chair and founder of Friends 
of Cancer Research, a cancer research think tank and advocacy group whose funding comes from 
large pharmaceutical companies.
62
  It would not be a stretch to say that drug and device 
                                                          
58
 PCORI Announces Funding for First Comparative Effectiveness Research Projects, 
http://www.pcori.org/2012/funding-awards/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2013). 
59
Longman, supra note 41 
60
 Supra note 54. 
61
Longman, supra note 41. 
62
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manufacturers have a stake in any research that could keep their drugs and devices from 
consumers by way of federal recommendations for use.   
Lastly, the FDA does not consider a drug’s cost at the time of the approval decision, only 
its safety and efficacy, and PPACA prohibits the use of quality-adjusted life years or other cost-
effectiveness metrics to be used in determining Medicare coverage or reimbursement as well.
63,64 
B.  The Case Against Comparative Effectiveness Research 
Opponents of the use of cost as a measure of a treatment’s effectiveness say that the 
assertion that health care spending can be reduced by foregoing medical technologies and 
treatment that add little benefit is misguided.
65
  They argue that in fact there is evidence that 
medical innovation is associated with “greater longevity” and that comparative effectiveness 
research could potentially decrease research and development through its impact on innovation 
in our society.
66
  If forced to conduct comparative effectiveness studies prior to and as a 
condition for coverage of a new medicine (note: this is currently not required), research and 
development costs would soar and researchers may just decide to forego the research 
altogether.
67
  One study found that CER has the potential to increase research and development 
costs by as much as 50 percent in certain phases of the drug development process and would 
reduce research and development spending by over $30 million over ten years if required to 
                                                          
63
 HOW FDA APPROVES DRUGS AND REGULATES THEIR SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS (2012), 
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65
 John Vernon, PhD, Robert Goldberg, PhD, Shorter Lives, Less Prosperity: The Impact of Comparative 
Effectiveness Research on Health and Wealth, CENTER FOR MEDICINE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST (2009), 
http://www.cmpi.org/uploads/File/CER_Paper_FINAL.pdf. 
66
 Id. 
67
 Id. 
14 
 
conduct CER studies during drug development.
68
  Additionally, this same study estimated that 
because research and development and higher life expectancy are correlated, CER could cost this 
country 81 million life years and $4 trillion dollars.
69
  Furthermore, another recent study that 
compared the effect of comparative effectiveness research on access to approved anti-cancer 
treatments in Europe and the United States demonstrated that the process led to delays of over 
two years and 60 percent fewer medications being made available when effectiveness reviews 
were in place.
70
   
Critics of CER point to the possibility of studies only examining a heterogeneous patient 
population, meaning that the results of a study will show that one treatment is superior over 
another on average.
71
  The treatment may work far better in one group but a study measuring 
average efficacy would not demonstrate this.
72
  One example of this effect can be seen in a case 
involving panitumumab, a drug used to treat metastatic colorectal cancer.
73
  In 2007, it was 
rejected for coverage in Europe for being similarly as effective as its predecessor chemotherapy 
that cost far less.
74
  A closer look at the data demonstrated that patients with a normal gene type 
responded far better than patients with a particular mutation in their genes.
75
  A CER study that 
only looked at the average benefits of those receiving the drug would have not captured this very 
important difference within the patient population.
76
  Luckily, this particular difference was 
discovered and the drug was approved for coverage the following year for those with a normal 
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gene.
77
  Supporters of CER take this concern to heart and note that knowing the average effect is 
better than having no knowledge at all.
78
  Additionally, CER will make information far more 
accessible to patients and providers alike since more expansive sets of information will allow 
providers to better tailor treatment to their patients.
79
  The finite entry criteria for clinical trials 
that the drug manufacturers require do not allow for the same sort of extensive objective analysis 
across many subgroups that CER does.
80
  The Institute of Medicine’s own recommendation on 
CER includes research involving very precise subgroups.
81
 
Proponents of comparative effectiveness studies suggest that one key element should be 
left out of the research in the short term, namely cost.
82
  Cost is the main factor within CER that 
creates controversy and including it in future research will increase the likelihood of exposing all 
such research to political vulnerability.
83
  Eliminating the financial factor in CER studies would 
still lead to valuable conclusions that would be useful to the general health care consumer 
population.
84
  Although, it would still leave the larger problem of an unsustainable health care 
industry untouched since cost is the real problem being faced. 
C.  The Oregon Health Plan as Not an Example of the Failure of Comparative Effectiveness Research 
The Oregon Health Plan (OHP) is often referred to as the Oregon Experiment because of 
the bold steps it took to expand Medicaid coverage for Oregonians, specifically those with 
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income below the federal poverty line.
85
  The Plan is often cited by opponents of cost 
effectiveness metrics as a failure of this type of decisionmaking because the implementation of 
rationing was unable to control costs.
86
  But this assertion is worthy of further investigation.   
The Oregon Medicaid Priority Setting Project was initiated in 1988 by Dr. John 
Kitzhaber, an emergency room physician turned state senator turned governor, and became the 
cornerstone of the Oregon Health Plan.
87
  The Oregon Health Fund Board described the five 
main goals of the plan as the following: 1) health care for the uninsured; 2) broad participation 
by providers; 3) decrease cost shifting and charity care; 4) a basic benefit package of effective 
services; and 5) a rational process for making decisions on how to allocate resources for health 
care.
88
  The approach was novel; the plan would limit the services covered under the plan in 
order to increase the number of people covered.
89
  The plan unfortunately has encountered some 
impediments to fulfilling its five stated goals.  The desired cost containment never came to 
fruition and providers began to limit access to Medicaid patients due to a decline in 
reimbursements.
90
  Soon after, plan beneficiaries became subject to premiums and copayments 
that are in effect to this day.
91
 
 The list of covered services was created with the goal of reducing costs by eliminating 
coverage for treatments that were not proven cost-effective.
92
  In essence, the plan sought to 
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cover those treatments that provided the biggest “bang-for-your-buck”.93  The problem, though, 
became how to make this determination and the word rationing came to the forefront of this 
project.
94
   
The covered services were to be determined by the Oregon Health Services Commission, 
a group that included providers and consumers or purchasers of health care services.
95
  This list 
would prioritize services deemed cost-effective and would exclude any service or treatment 
determined to be cost-ineffective.
96
  Dr. Kitzhaber viewed this particular aspect of the program 
as a way to impact physician decisionmaking, which, according to him, controls 70 percent of 
the health care budget  through the effects of their decisions to hospitalize (or not), what 
procedure to perform, and what drugs to prescribe.
97
  The Commission first created a list of 709 
diagnoses and their treatments, which were referred to as “condition/treatment pairs”.98  The list 
was intended to be purely objective and to be based on a mathematical formula that combined 
clinical data and outcomes research.
99
  Condition/treatment pairs would be moved up or down 
the list based on this cost-benefit formulary or onto the list in the case of new treatments and 
procedures.
100
  Any additional condition/treatment pairs were to be added based on this 
formula.
101
 Several condition/treatment prioritization lists were proposed and rejected.
102
  The 
list that was eventually put into practice used a ranking system that was not purely based on cost-
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effectiveness, as originally planned but, but also included many metrics based on subjective 
judgment.
103
  The Commission’s instructions to the clinical advisory panels conducting outcomes 
research even included instructions such as the following: “It is understood that some outcome 
data may be subjective in nature.  A disease may be bimodal with significantly different 
outcomes occurring dependent on age of onset or vary according to the extent of the disease at 
the time of presentation (stage).  If this is the case… please think of the average patient that 
presents with this condition not the extremes.”104  Additionally, the lack of sound scientific 
studies that considered the costs and benefits of various treatments was concerning to many 
participating providers because it was not known how exactly the Commission was to create a 
list based on objective factors.
105
  In fact, the Commission encouraged providers to continue to 
make “medical decisions … based on their best clinical judgment,” which led to physicians 
exercising their judgment and deciding to pursue treatments and services that were not covered 
by the Plan.
106
  Essentially, the Commission was relying on these panels to provide outcomes 
information based on their clinical judgment – a subjective approach – and not on the formulaic 
and objective approach that was intended.  Cost-effectiveness yielded to other factors, including 
political pressures, in determining coverage and was essentially abandoned.
107
 
The list was not and is not utilized as envisioned.  Plan participants receive many services 
and treatments that were meant to be excluded, whether it is through loopholes in the plan or 
physicians diagnosing patients with covered diagnoses, when in fact an “uncovered” diagnosis 
                                                          
103
 Id. 
104
 U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, EVALUATION OF THE OREGON MEDICAID PROPOSAL, 
OTA-H-531 (1992). 
105
 Jacobs, supra note 100. 
106
 Id. 
107
 Id. (The OHP gained national media attention in 1987 when Coby Howard, a seven-year-old boy with leukemia, 
was denied a bone marrow transplant.  OHP had cut funding in organ transplants in order to change coverage.  This 
case led to some of the political pressure that led to abandoning the objective-focus of the list.) 
19 
 
may be more appropriate.
108
  The program overall has not demonstrated promising results.  The 
percentage of uninsured Oregonians is not significantly different than the percentage of 
uninsured in the rest of the country.
109
  (See Figure 3
110
).  Additionally, Oregon’s Medicaid 
expenditures have tracked the country’s Medicaid expenditures, demonstrating that the plan has 
not led to the hoped for decrease in spending.
111
  (See Figure 4
112
).  Regardless of one’s opinion 
of why the Oregon Health Plan may be a failure or has not met its goals, one thing is clear – 
neither rationing nor the cost-effectiveness determination for coverage was what led to the lack 
of success of the great Oregon Experiment.  Furthermore, one of the Plan’s uses of cost 
effectiveness that remains in place has proven quite successful.  The Plan’s formulary members 
compare drugs to create a list of preferred and covered drugs under the plan.
113
  A drug is 
covered if it is determined to be “as effective as any other drug in the class but more cost-
effective.”114  This appears to be the essence of what makes comparative effectiveness research 
so valuable.  The objective determinations based on effectiveness and outcomes research 
flourish, whereas subjective determinations do not. 
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D.  Findings 
 The wavering legislation between congressional proposals pushing for comparative clinical 
effectiveness research and an institute that is forbidden from using comparative effectiveness metrics 
Figure 3 
Figure 4 
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suggests a deep ambivalence towards CER by our government.
115
  PCORI almost seems like a 
consolation prize to proponents of CER.  There are valid arguments against the use of CER on the 
front end of research, where the effect could lead to an increase in research and development costs.
116
  
The arguments against CER on the back-end, where the decisions of what to offer patients are made, 
do not seem as strong.  As an example, the OHP is often cited as an example of the failure of rationing 
but a closer look demonstrated that in fact the comparative effectiveness metrics were not carried out 
as intended.  Comparative effectiveness research has not been properly implemented in this country 
by the government so perhaps it should be implemented voluntarily by the private sector.  Memorial 
Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center is one example of a private institution that made a decision based on 
the evidence available to them, including cost. 
PART II: MEMORIAL SLOAN-KETTERING AS AN EXAMPLE OF PRIVATE SECTOR USE OF 
COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH 
The vehicle was the New York Times.  The words were those of three Memorial Sloan-
Kettering Cancer Center (MSKCC) oncologists.  Dr. Peter Bach, Dr. Leonard Saltz, and Dr. 
Robert Wittes made the bold decision to author an op-ed piece titled In Cancer Care Cost Matters 
that appeared in the October 14, 2012, issue of the New York Times.
117
  The op-ed detailed 
MSKCC’s decision to exclude Zaltrap® (ziv-aflibercept) from the hospital’s formulary.118  The 
Food and Drug Administration had recently approved Zaltrap (manufactured by Sanofi-Aventis) 
on August 3, 2012, for use in combination with chemotherapy to treat metastatic colorectal 
cancer.
119
  The MSKCC physicians’ decisionmaking followed a comparative effectiveness 
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research framework by using such factors as overall survival benefit, the side effect profile, 
patient convenience, and the fairly controversial factor of cost.
120,121 
A.   The Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center Decision
122
 
The MSKCC physicians wanted Zaltrap to work.  The Phase I trials were done at 
MSKCC and unfortunately all evidence showed that the drug in fact did not work as well as the 
investigators wanted it to.  It is a common misconception that Phase I trials do not evaluate 
efficacy and simply determine safety dosage.  The modern and sensible approach is to look for 
activity in a Phase I trial and if it is not seen, it is highly unlikely that there will be activity in a 
Phase II trial of the same drug, and therefore a Phase II trial does not pose good cost-
effectiveness.  During Zaltrap’s research and development process, there was another agent 
known as Avastin that had been approved by the FDA in 2004 for use in patients with metastatic 
colorectal cancer.  MSKCC has been using Avastin since its approval. 
 As Chair of MSKCC’s Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee, Dr. Saltz began to 
prepare the necessary paperwork for adding the newly approved Zaltrap to the hospital’s 
formulary.  Although not terribly excited about the drug’s prospects, the hospital had never not 
placed a newly FDA-approved drug on the formulary.  Dr. Saltz had every reason to believe it 
would be approved.  What followed was an email from a pharmacy administrator that changed 
the course of this drug, at least within MSKCC.  The administrator informed Dr. Saltz that 
Zaltrap had been priced at over $11,000 on average for a month of treatment, more than twice 
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the price of the standard of care, Avastin, which costs about $5,000 a month.  Dr. Saltz 
approached the entire gastrointestinal oncology service with one simple question – knowing the 
data and the newly found price, could anyone envision using the drug?  Nobody could.  The next 
step was to approach the Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee with a new message and plenty 
of data. 
“Sanofi-Aventis chose to pretend that Avastin didn’t exist.”  MSKCC did everything but 
that and drew upon the similarities between Zaltrap and Avastin when the Pharmacy and 
Therapeutics Committee met to discuss Zaltrap.  Seen in Figures 5 and 6 are the Overall Survival 
curves for Zaltrap (Figure 5) and Avastin (Figure 6).
123
  The survival curves were virtually 
identical.  Both were compared to the same chemotherapy regimen and both showed an equal 
overall survival benefit of 1.4 months.  This was not entirely surprising since both drugs also 
work along the same molecular pathway.  They are both Vascular Endothelial Growth Factor 
(VEGF) inhibitors.
124
  Both drugs are also used in the same setting – second-line colorectal 
indication – meaning that the VEGF inhibitors are used after frontline chemotherapy fails in 
patients with metastatic colorectal cancer.  The study that Sanofi-Aventis used when filing for 
FDA approval became commonly known as the VELOUR trial.  Often trials that follow similar 
molecular pathways require that patients have been treated with the similar drug and that the 
drug have failed prior to moving on to the new treatment so that the investigators have an idea of 
the similarity in response rates in what may be, especially in this case, very similar treatments.  
The study design in this case did not require that patients have frontline Avastin, or another 
VEGF inhibitor, and about half were naïve to VEGF inhibitors.  The side effects profiles of the 
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drugs were also incredibly similar and perhaps even worse in Zaltrap.  Both were required to 
carry black box warnings indicating that the FDA felt that the drugs carried a significant risk of 
serious adverse events.  The boxed warnings were for gastrointestinal perforation and 
hemorrhaging. Additionally, Avastin was also slightly more convenient for patients because it 
takes less time to administer than Zaltrap.
125
 
In addition to the clinical data, the MSKCC physicians looked to clinical practice 
guidelines.  The National Comprehensive Cancer Network (NCCN) guidelines suggest that 
Zaltrap is no better than Avastin in the second-line setting for metastatic colorectal cancer.
126
  
Furthermore, the NCCN guidelines state that besides being essentially equivalent, they point out 
that there are no data to suggest that switching a patient to Zaltrap after Avastin has failed, or 
vice versa, would provide any benefit to the patient.
127 
 The one stark difference between Zaltrap and Avastin lay in the financial characteristics 
of each drug.  One month of Avastin treatment costs about $5,000, while a month of Zaltrap 
treatment costs over $11,000.
128
  Using comparative effectiveness metrics, the cost of Zaltrap for 
one year of life-gained is $585,200.
129
  Regardless of one’s methodology to determine cost-
effectiveness, Zaltrap appeared clearly cost ineffective as compared to what was already 
available, so MSKCC decided to make it unavailable to its patient population.
130
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Within a week, the president of the American Society of Clinical Oncology had written a 
letter to the New York Times editor which was published on October 19, 2012.
131
  Dr. Swain 
spoke encouragingly of MSKCC’s decision and seemingly endorsed their action by stating it 
“reflect[ed] a much-needed willingness to address the elephant in the room: unsustainable costs 
in cancer care.”132  The CEO of Sanofi-Aventis, Christoper Viebacher, rebuffed the new and 
controversial concerns that the drug was not appropriately priced and claimed that it was 
competitively priced to the standard of care – Avastin – based on comparable dosing.133  He went 
on to say that “the spirit of the op-ed [was] something [he] would fully subscribe to” and that 
“we really need to make sure that there is complete access with enough incentive for 
research.”134   
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  B.  The Compromising Financial Compromise 
 Less than two weeks later, Sanofi-Aventis announced that it was reducing the price of 
Zaltrap due to “market resistance.”135  Although, there would be no change in Zaltrap’s official 
price, Sanofi-Aventis would begin to offer an approximately fifty-percent discount, creating a 
potentially problematic compromise.
136
  Sanofi-Aventis had overtly admitted to setting the price 
of the drug as what they saw their competition –Genentech’s Avastin – and not on how valuable 
the drug could be to patients or how well it worked in the clinical trials.
137
  Sanofi-Aventis had 
conducted a marketing study of seventy oncologists which showed that 55 percent of them used 
Avastin at a dose of 10mg/kg versus the 5mg.kg.
138
  Notably, the composition of their sample 
group consisted mostly of private practitioners.
139
  It could be said that the sample group was 
comprised of physicians who have a financial incentive to use a higher dose because they are 
paid by the number of milligrams of drug that they use.  Although it is not illegal to use 10mg/kg 
in colorectal cancer patients, and in fact, in every other cancer that Avastin is used for, 
oncologists use the 10mg/kg dose.
140
  Both doses are listed for use on the Avastin label, but the 
lower dose of Avastin produces equivalent results to its 10mg/kg counterpart and offers the 
patient a lower risk of side effects.
141
  The MSKCC oncologists, and to the best of their 
knowledge, their colleagues at other academic institutions, all use the 5mg/kg dose of Avastin.
142
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In addition, all relevant treatment guidelines recommend the 5mg/kg dose.
143
  So when Sanofi-
Aventis pegged their price for Zaltrap to the 10mg/kg dose of Avastin, it was misguided and this 
led to a pricing that was essentially twice that of Avastin. 
 The response came in the form of a 50 percent discount, which can be thought of as a 
coupon that the hospital or physician would use when purchasing Zaltrap.
144
  There was nothing 
in writing and therefore what has not changed is the official price of the drug as reported to the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).
145
  Changing the published price to 50 
percent of the listed price would require that an active step be taken with CMS, which as of now 
has not been done.
146 
 Additionally, any reimbursement rates are based on the price set by 
Sanofi-Aventis.
147
  What is potentially very problematic is that if the Medicare reimbursement 
rates are not adjusted, a scenario would exist where prescribing physicians stand to gain 
financially from using Zaltrap.
148 
 Most academic institutions do not accept the sort of discount that Sanofi-Aventis created, 
MSKCC included, due to potential incentives in prescribing the drug.
149
  A look at Medicare 
reimbursement practices, for example, demonstrates how a 50 percent discount could create this 
incentive.  A drug’s wholesale acquisition cost (WAC) is the manufacturer’s published price to 
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wholesale buyers.
150
  Medicare’s reimbursement price is based on an average WAC for the first 
two quarters following the drug’s launch in combination with the first two quarters’ average 
sales price of the drug, plus six percent.
151
  A drug’s average sales price (ASP) is defined as the 
manufacturer’s sales of a drug to all purchasers in a calendar quarter divided by the total number 
of units of the drug sold by the manufacturer in that same quarter, excluding Medicaid rebates 
and other discounts.
152
  Drugs are reimbursed at 80 percent of 106 percent of the Average Sales 
Price.
153
  There would be a potential cost incentive to a doctor to prescribe the drug because it 
would be sold to them at Sanofi-Aventis’ 50 percent discount off WAC but then it would be 
reimbursed at the 80 percent rate and charged at the wholesale rate to the patients, plus 6 
percent.
154
  Figure 7 demonstrates the flow of funds for a fictional drug priced at $1,000 that a 
provider would purchase using a 50 percent type discount, similar to the Zaltrap discount.
155
  The 
drug’s WAC in the first quarter would be $1,000 (pre-discount).  The drug’s WAC in the second 
quarter would be $500 (post-50 percent discount).  The weighted average sales price based on 
the first two quarters to Medicare beneficiaries would be $750.  The providers pay out $500 to 
acquire the drug but take in $750 ($600 from Medicare and $150 from the patient).  By statute, 
Medicare does not possess the ability to immediately bargain for the lower price.
156
  On the other 
hand, insurance companies may be able to, which could lead to copayment savings for those 
patients insured by private insurance.
157
  These renegotiations may lead to decreasing any 
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possible incentive to treat with this pricey, yet discounted, drug.  The unresolved issue regarding 
Medicare beneficiaries would remain though. 
 
C.  Findings and Recommendations 
 This decision to exclude Zaltrap from MSKCC’s formulary should be uncontroversial 
and to date, only Sanofi-Aventis has resisted in praising the decision.  Avastin was the readily 
available, widely used, cheaper, and equally effective alternative.  The struggle comes in 
spreading this type of decisionmaking to other hospitals.  Perhaps this was too easy and too 
perfect of a decision to make.  Zaltrap and Avastin mirrored each other with the exception of 
their cost.  Other treatment counterparts do not measure so equally, making the decision much 
more difficult.  At least one other institution, US Oncology, has publicly stated that they also 
Figure 7 
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excluded Zaltrap from their formulary.
158
  On the other hand, Ohio State included Zaltrap in its 
formulary but they had no plans to offer the treatment until the discount was announced.
159
 
 Perhaps the answer is in the formulary (pharmacy and therapeutics) committee itself.  
Formulary committee guidelines state that “a formulary system is the ongoing process through 
which a health care organization establishes policies regarding the use of drugs, therapies, and 
drug-related products and identifies those that are most medically appropriate and cost-effective 
to best service the health interests of a given patient population.”160  The cost-effectiveness 
aspect of formulary inclusion or exclusion does not seem to be taking place if MSKCC’s 
decision was considered so bold and groundbreaking.  Formulary guidelines also state that 
formulary decisions should be based on evidence-based evaluation, which is defined as “as 
systematic approach to the evaluation of biomedical literature and application to clinical practice 
and should be applied to formulary decisionmaking for medication product selection.”161  
Evidence-based decisionmaking with the consideration of cost is at the core of CER.  The 
problem may lie in the final gatekeepers to the pricier drugs – the formulary committee – and the 
possibility that they are not following their own guidelines. 
PART IV: ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS AS AN INDIRECT PROMOTION OF 
COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH 
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 Elliott Fisher, the Director of the Center for Health Policy Research at Dartmouth 
Medical School, first coined the term Accountable Care Organization (ACO) in 2006.
162
  ACOs 
were drafted into three healthcare reform bills in 2009 but the pinnacle came in 2010 when the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) included the concept in its final 
legislation.
163
  Appearing in Section 3022, PPACA authorizes the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services to “establish a shared savings program … that promotes accountability for a 
patient population and coordinates items and services under parts A and B, and encourages 
investment in infrastructure and redesigned care processes for high quality and efficient delivery 
service.”164  The current Medicare payment method is quite fragmented, paying hospitals and 
their physicians separately and paying physicians separate fees for the same patients depending 
on the diagnosis and treatment received (commonly known as fee-for-service).
165
  This 
fragmented method promotes anything but coordination and accountability.
166
 An ACO would 
not do away with the fee-for-service method of payment but would instead create financial 
incentives through bonuses when providers keep costs low.
167
  The providers and hospitals 
would also have to meet certain quality benchmarks that focus on preventative measures and 
managing chronic conditions.
168
  This is one way that ACOs are held accountable, a key measure 
of their success.  There are process, outcome, and efficiency measurements.  A process 
measurement looks at whether a particular service was provided to a patient consistent with 
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clinical guidelines.
169
  An outcome measurement evaluates how well patients are doing after 
receiving health care services.
170
  An efficiency measurement assesses the cost of care as 
compared to its quality, i.e., did a provider use a costlier treatment when a less costly alternative 
was available and would have worked just as well.
171
 
 Determining how an incentive payment for meeting quality benchmarks and lowering 
costs involves evaluating four factors: the benchmark against which expenditures will be 
compared, the minimum savings rate, the sharing or loss rate, and how the benchmark will be 
updated.
172
  Determining the comparator benchmark focuses on establishing the patient 
population that will be served, whether there will be one or multiple benchmarks based on 
different patient groups, and how the benchmarks will be adjusted.
173
  The minimum savings or 
loss rate is the percentage above which the ACO would share in savings or pay back any 
losses.
174
  This rate accounts for fluctuations in expenditures in case they occur.
175
  CMS has set 
the minimum rate at 2 percent, meaning if an ACO’s rate is set at 2 percent but their 
expenditures happen to increase by 4 percent in a given year, they would be penalized because 
they went above the allowable 2 percent loss.
176
  Staying within that 2 percent would lead to no 
penalty.
177
  The sharing or loss rate is the rate that the ACO will receive as an incentive 
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payment.
178
  A Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) ACO will use a 50 percent sharing 
rate (even higher for those ACOs that assume greater risk).
179
  The rate is determined by a 
measure known as a quality score.
180
  A quality score takes into account certain factors like 
patient/caregiver experience, preventative health, and implementation of electronic health 
records.
181
  For example, an ACO that generates $100,000 in savings over the minimum savings 
rate and receives a perfect quality score of 100 percent would receive $50,000 as an incentive 
payment (50% sharing rate x 100% quality score x $100,000).
182
  A lower quality score, for 
example 75 percent, would lead to a lower incentive payment (50% sharing rate x 75% quality 
score x $100,000 = $37,500 incentive payment).
183
  Lastly, an ACO needs to determine when 
and how its benchmark will be updated.
184
 
 The purpose of ironing out the details of an ACO is to demonstrate that its elements very 
closely align with those of CER.  Some have opined that if CER results are to influence the 
choices of physicians and their patients, the results must be accompanied by economic 
incentives.
185
  It appears that ACOs, through their financial motivations for cost-saving, are this 
very incentive that has been spoken of.  Despite PPACA’s prohibition on PCORI using QALYs 
and similar metrics, an argument can be made that the law may have indirectly and inadvertently 
encouraged the consideration of cost during the treatment determination process.
186
  An ACO 
cannot save money and thereby partake in the financial incentives without including cost in the 
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treatment determination process.  It should be noted that cost cannot be the only factor when 
providers undergo treatment decisionmaking since their quality scores and other benchmarks are 
based on patient health and satisfaction outcomes.  CER also is not entirely based on cost, 
although its opponents would have you believe this.
187
  CER’s goal is to generate data that 
compares the benefits of various treatments, which will undoubtedly include cost, since a patient 
will benefit from saving money.  ACO providers will exclude pricier and no more effective 
treatments because they will be incentivized to do so, whether it is through meeting their 
efficiency measurement benchmarks or ensuring that they maintain an adequate share or loss 
ratio that will lead to savings. 
PART IV: CONCLUSION 
 In returning to the concept of the moral hazard, CER appears to fit in quite nicely as the 
vehicle to eliminating the concept of over-consumption by the insured.  The OHP was an attempt 
at removing the costlier, less-effective options from the table but faltered due to outside 
pressures.  The OHP should not be viewed as a failure of CER decisionmaking but as a learning 
lesson.  Their objective formula for inclusion or exclusion to the list does not seem so passé 
when there is research pointing to the ability of mathematical models to out-perform doctors in 
predicting patient outcomes.
188
 
Memorial Sloan-Kettering took a giant leap at removing an option from the table through 
their decision to exclude the pricey Zaltrap from their formulary.  Their publication of this 
decision has inspired other oncologists to stand up to big pharmaceutical manufacturers and their 
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pricing practices but it is unclear how the pharmaceutical companies will respond.
189
  Before 
waiting for the companies to respond, one area worth evaluating are the practices of formulary 
committees, whose very guidelines dictate the use of cost as an inclusion/exclusion criteria, but 
this does not seem to be put into practice. 
 The ramifications of a MSKCC-type decision are still unclear.  MSKCC has thus far 
received only positive feedback regarding their decision but long term legal consequences are 
still unclear.  The pharmaceutical companies may be the party that should be concerned.  After a 
decision to exclude a pricey drug, it would seem that pricing a drug based on your competition 
does not seem to be the smart move.  They are now on notice that not everyone will put up with 
their decisions.  A company’s loyalty is to its shareholders bottom line may lead them to avoid 
CER studies at the front-end of their research development process but it should also lead to 
smarter marketing studies.  Could a flawed marketing study, like the one that led to the 
misguided Zaltrap pricing create actionable grounds for shareholders against the company?  At 
least some consider Zaltrap to be one of the worst drug launches of all time.
190
  The resistance to 
egregious drug-pricing is building and for the time being, the power seems to be on the side of 
the private sector’s use of comparative effectiveness research to do away with the expensive 
drugs if the pharmaceutical companies refuse to do so. 
                                                          
189
 Stacy Cowley, Doctors Blast Ethics of $100,000 Cancer Drugs, CNN MONEY (April 25, 2013, 10:55AM) 
http://money.cnn.com/2013/04/25/news/economy/cancer-drug-cost/index.html?source=cnn_bin 
190
 10 top drug launch disasters, FIERCEPHARMA, (Nov. 27, 2012) http://www.fiercebiotech.com/tags/zaltrap. 
